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Summary 
A Trusted CI engagement report with the Singularity team at Sylabs was inadvertently published 
prematurely due to miscommunication within the Trusted CI team. A secondary leak was 
discovered in the resume of a Trusted CI team member and weaknesses were discovered in the 
incident response process of Trusted CI. This report describes these events and the steps 
Trusted CI took in responding. An analysis of those events follows along with a set of planned 
remediations by Trusted CI to avoid a future incident and strengthen Trusted CI’s incident 
response processes. 
Background: Engagement Reports 
Typically Trusted CI produces a report at the end of each of its engagements with a member of 
the community. These ​Engagement Reports​ typically describe Trusted CI’s findings and 
recommended actions. Such reports are minimally delivered to the engaged project. When the 
project so agrees, reports are publicly published at the end of an engagement after review and 
approval by both Trusted CI and the engaged project. An ​Embargoed Engagement Report​ is a 
report whose publication is delayed by mutual agreement, typically to give the engaged party an 
opportunity to rectify issues discussed in the report before those issues are made public. 
 
Trusted CI publishes reports via a scholarly archive, either ​IDEALS​ at U. Illinois or the ​Indiana 
University Scholarworks system​. Both of these archives provide a sustained repository to 
ensure the product is available in the future as promised in Trusted CI’s Data Management 
Plan. They also provide a ​Handle​ for the report: a unique, persistent handle.net URL, which 
guarantees an immutable reference to the report. 
 
It is typical for Trusted CI to reserve a Handle ahead of report publication so that a citation for 
the report can be provided in the report. Trusted CI includes this Handle in the “Using & Citing 
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this Work” section of each full report.  This allows parties reading a report to easily find a 
correct, consistent reference. To reserve a Handle in the IDEALS system, some form of PDF 
must be published. Typically, the report’s title page is uploaded first to generate the Handle.  
 
Trusted CI has specific team members who act as liaisons between other Trusted CI team 
members and the operators of IDEALS and IU Scholarworks to publish and otherwise 
administer Trusted CI’s documents published in these services. Trusted CI liaisons do not have 
the ability to update documents after publication and must interface with the service operators to 
update a document after publication. 
Primary Incident 
An Embargoed Engagement Report, describing work between Trusted CI and the Singularity 
development team at Sylabs.io, was prematurely published by the Trusted CI team. An 
engagement team member was attempting to secure a Handle prior to publication and due to 
miscommunication, the full report, instead of the cover page, was published to the IDEALS 
service. There was no malicious intent. The operator of IDEALS bears no blame and no other 
party was involved. 
Secondary Issue: Disagreement Regarding Report 
A secondary issue was that the report contents were still in a state of disagreement with the 
Sylabs team. The Sylabs team disagreed with the language used by the Trusted CI 
engagement team in called the finding of Trusted CI a “vulnerability” and this issue had not been 
resolved at the time of premature publication. 
Secondary Issue: Inclusion of Embargoed Report Content in 
Resume 
Another secondary issue, reported to Trusted CI by Sylabs, was that content from the 
embargoed report was referenced with some detail, included details in dispute, in a public 
resume of a Trusted CI engagement team member. 
Incident Timeline 
Jul 26 2019 - The engagement report was published in IDEALS. 
 
Sep 30 2019 - A third party informed the Trusted CI engagement lead that the embargoed 
report was public on IDEALS. 
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Sep 30 2019 - The engagement lead contacted the Trusted CI IDEALS publication liaison, 
specifically requesting that the document be removed.  It was also at this time that the Trusted 
CI Director was informed of the incident. 
 
Oct 1 2019 - The Trusted CI IDEALS publication liaison confirmed that the document was 
removed (and replaced with just a cover-sheet). 
 
Oct 2 2019 - The ​Trusted CI Director​ asked the Trusted CI CISO (henceforth, CISO) to 
investigate the incident. 
 
Oct 2 2019 - The Trusted CI ISO team (henceforth, ISO), immediately concerned with legal 
policy, contacted the engagement lead and verified that the report was *not* under NDA.  The 
CISO additionally asked and learned that a notification had *not* been sent to the engagee. 
 
Oct 3 2019 - The ISO verified that the embargoed report was no longer cached by Google. 
 
Oct 4 2019 - The CISO contacted both the engagement lead and the IDEALS publication 
liaison, requesting information leading up to the premature publication in order to understand 
how the error came about; this led to an internal document thoroughly examining the error. 
 
Oct 11 2019 - The CISO drafted a notification to Sylabs informing them of the data exposure, 
and after reviewing its contents with the engagement lead, sent the notification. 
 
Oct 12 2019 - Sylabs responded to the ‘exposure notification’, thanking us for the notification, 
but expressing (i) embarrassment caused by the exposure, (ii) unwillingness to make the report 
public, and (iii) a desire to further discuss publication of the report.  The CISO notified Trusted 
CI leadership of the response. 
 
Oct 12 2019 - The ​Trusted CI Director​ assumed control of communications with Sylab and sent 
an apology to the engagee, expressing a desire to meet with them. 
 
Oct 14 2019 - Sylabs reported that a content from the embargoed report was found in a resume. 
 
Oct 15 2019 - Offending resume was removed; the ​Trusted CI Director​ informed engagee of 
removal. 
 
Oct 16 2019 - ​Trusted CI Director​ informed Trusted CI’s NSF Program Officer of the incident. 
 
Oct 17 2019 - During the NSF Cybersecurity Summit, the ​Trusted CI Director​ informed the 
community verbally that Trusted CI had experienced an incident, without detail, and stated that 
Trusted CI would publish its findings as transparently as possible. 
 
3 
Trusted CI Incident Response Report 2019-10-02_01 
Approved for Public Distribution 
Oct 17 2019 - ​Trusted CI Director​ and Sylabs setup a meeting for Oct 23 2019 to discuss the 
status of the report’s publication. That meeting and a subsequent meeting have been productive 
with the goal being a published revised version of the engagement report. 
Incident Analysis 
After the incident, the Trusted CI team as a whole participated in an after action analysis. The 
following Findings resulted: 
 
1. Trusted CI lacks a documented policy for labeling documents that are restricted in their 
distribution and the responsibilities of all Trusted CI teams members in enforcing those 
restrictions. 
2. Trusted CI lacks a documented policy on how and when are the outcomes from its 
engagements are published. This includes engagee review and dispute resolution. 
The analysis of Trusted CI’s response to the incident yielded the following additional Findings: 
 
3. The Trusted CI Director and CISO were not in sync with regards to their roles during 
incident response. Trusted CI’s own Incident Response (IR) policy was insufficient to 
optimally guide our response.  Specifically (from ​Trusted CI’s MISPP​), the directions set 
forth for Trusted CI’s ISO define only priorities: 
The priorities of Trusted CI Incident Response will be: 
1. Minimize loss of confidentiality of Trusted CI sensitive and 
engagement-related documents. 
2. Understand the scope of any loss of confidentiality, integrity or 
availability. 
3. Restore Trusted CI activities to normal. 
 
4. Communication with the engaged project was not appropriate prioritized and should 
have taken place sooner. 
Planned Remediations 
The following remediations are planned: 
1. Trusted CI shall create a policy for ​Data labeling: how does Trusted CI label and handle 
documents and other work products to control their dissemination. 
2. Trusted CI shall create a policy for Engagement Disclosure: How and when are the 
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outcomes from engagements published? This policy includes engagee review and the 
resolution of disputes regarding report  content. The policy will also cover “side 
disclosure" of results in resumes, blogs, etc. by staff involved. 
3. Given that these will represent Trusted CI’s first formal policies, Trusted CI will develop 
procedures to ensure policies are easily locatable and existing and new staff trained in 
their application. 
4. The Trusted CI CISO will develop a more comprehensive Incident Response plan 
capturing key roles and responsibilities, and communication with key parties. The CISO 
will regularly hold ​table top exercises​ among the Trusted CI team to regularly educate 
the team and test the plans. 
5. To support the other remediations, an increase of effort in the Trusted CI information 
security team is needed. The CISO has requested a one-time increase to .5 FTE (from .17 
FTE today)  for 1H2020 to implement the remediations, with ongoing effort to be 
determined. 
To the extent it is operationally prudent, the above will be publicly available to the Trusted CI 
community. 
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